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As complex expert testimony continues to be
more and more a part of the fabric of modem
trials, so too will we witness an increase in tri
als within trials, or mini-trials, the purpose of
which is to test the reliability, validity, and ulti
mately the admissibility of expert testimony.
These mini-trial attacks on witnesses who pro
pose to testify arise from recent decisions of
bo th the U n ited States and C alifornia
Supreme Courts, as well as the U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeal. These decisions about
expert and scientific testimony begin with the
United States Supreme Court decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals in 1993
and continue with the Ninth Circuit Decision
in Daubert on Remand in 1995. The California
a p p ro ach was set ou t by the C alifornia
Supreme Court in People v. Kelly in 1976 and
was reaffirmed in 1994 in People v. Leahy, in
which the Court rejected Daubert. Careful
attention to the precepts of the Ninth Circuit
opinion in Daubert will assist in avoiding the
pitfalls of the Daubert analysis and will aid in
the successful presentation of often controver
sial scientific and other expert testimony.
A recent U.S. Suprem e C ourt decision
expanded the power of trial judges in deter
mining admissibility regarding expert testi
mony. In General Electric Company vs. Joiner
(118. S.Ct. 512 (1997)), a worker sued his
employer alleging that exposure to toxic
chemicals caused him to contract cancer. The
Trial Court ruled that certain expert opinions
were inadm issible. T he Circuit C ourt of
Appeal reversed the Trial C ourt’s ruling,

applying a stringent standard
of review to the decision of
the trial judge. The Supreme
C ourt reversed the Circuit
Court and reinstated the deci
sion of the trial judge, hold
ing that:

...the Court of Appeals erred in its review of
the exclusion of Joiner’s experts’ testimony. In
applying an overly ‘stringent’ review to that rul
ing, it failed to give the Trial Court the defer
ence that is the hallmark of abuse of discretion
review.... We believe that a proper application
of the correct standard of review here indicates
that the District Court did not abuse its discre
tion.

Thus, by its decision in Joiner, the Supreme
Court has vested in trial judges even greater
powers to determine the scope and shape of
trials. When complex technical and expert
testimony is involved and the stakes are high,
trial judges will need to make close and diffi
cult decisions. Joiner teaches us that these deci
sions will rarely be disturbed on appeal.
Accordingly, the forum in which to prepare
and win these fights is the Trial Court.
THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF DAUBERT AND
DAUBERT ON REMAND

Prior to the Suprem e C ourt decision in
Daubert, the admissibility of scientific evidence
was governed by the “general acceptance”
standard of the Frye decision. (Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). In
Daubert, the Supreme Court held that the
Federal Rules of Evidence displaced Frye and
o th e r like cases (Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., U.S., 113 S. Ct. 2786,
2794 (1993) (Daubert I)). But the Court failed
or refused to define admissibility, choosing
instead to rem and the Daubert case to the
Ninth Circuit with certain “general observa-
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tions” about how courts should analyze admis
sibility. It was left then to the Ninth Circuit on
remand to grapple with the admissibility test
and fashion a workable rule to be applied by
trial judges.
THE NINTH CIRCUIT DAUBERT ANALYSIS

Since the Supreme Court decision, more than
thirteen hundred cases have been published
that discuss the Daubert standard. None, how
ever, is m ore instructive than the N inth
Circuit decision, which provides, in consider
able detail, a road map for the presentation of
the Daubert attack as well as the way out of the
forest (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) (Daubert II)).
In remanding the Daubert case to the Ninth
Circuit, the Supreme Court handed to the
Court panel a two-prong test of admissibility.
First, did the proposed evidence have suffi
cient reliability in that it was “derived by scien
tific method” and the expert’s work product
amounted to “good science” (Daubert II, 113
S. Ct. at 2795, 2797)? Second, is the evidence
“relevant to the task at hand” in that a logical
“fit” exists between the testimony and a mater
ial issue of the case (Id. at 2797)? Although
the Supreme Court did enumerate some fac
tors to consider in d eterm ining the first
prong, they did not provide much more guid
ance. Against this backdrop, the Ninth Circuit
opinion of Judge Kozinski enters the “brave
new world” of judges as the final arbiters of
what is “good science” and what is not.
The Ninth Circuit Court first addressed the
reliability prong of the Supreme Court opin
ion dealing with scientific knowledge. Having
wrestled with a multiplicity of factors that
might be considered, the Court settled on
three major factors that would establish to the

satisfaction of the Court that the proffered
evidence constituted reliable expert knowl
edge derived by the scientific method. These
factors are:
1. Whether the research that produced the
opinion evidence was derived from the litiga
tion process or ind ep en d en t of litigation
(Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1316-17).
2. Whether the expert has published his or
her work and, if published, whether the pub
lished work has been subject to peer review
analysis (Id. at 1318).
3. Whether the expert and proponent of
the evidence can identify an objective
source—usually an independent witness—
who can attest that the methods used were
acceptable to at least a recognized minority of
the scientific community, if not a majority of
the community involved (Id. at 1319).
Significantly, the Court considered these
factors “illustrative rather than exhaustive”
and not necessarily “equally applicable (or
applicable at all) in every case” (Id. at 1317).
In a subsequent decision, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized that “scientific method, as it is
practiced by (at least) a recognized minority
of scientists in the field” is enough for admissi
bility even if tests were not conducted inde
pendently of litigation nor subject to peer
review, because “these are only two of the ways
plaintiffs can dem onstrate adm issibility”
under the first prong of the Daubert analysis
(Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d
1134,1142 (9th Cir. 1997)).
In analyzing the second prong enunciated
in Daubert I—the “fit” and relevancy require
ment—the Ninth Circuit relied on the “help
fulness” standard of Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Such a standard requires
that the proffered expert evidence be relevant
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to an issue to be determined in the case and
assist the trier of fact in resolving the issue
(Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1320). If the evidence is
found not to be helpful in the determination
of the issue, then the evidence is irrelevant,
would lead to jury confusion, and should be
excluded.
DAUBERT AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD—
THE METHODOLOGY-CONCLUSION DISTINCTION

Although the Daubert analysis of both the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit is spe
cific and detailed, one overriding concept
m ust be kept in m ind. T he focus of the
Daubert challenge cannot and should not be
on the worthiness or believability of the ulti
mate opinion that the witness proposes to
render. Instead, the focus, as the Supreme
C ourt instructs, m ust be on w hether the
m ethod and principles from which the evi
dence is derived are consistent with the scien
tific method. As the Supreme Court explicitly
stated:
The inquiry envisioned is...a flexible one. Its
overarching subject is the scientific validity—
and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliabil
ity—of the principles that underlie a proposed
submission. The focus, of course, must be solely
on principles and methodology, not on the con
clusions that they generate.

Therefore, ‘T he test under Daubert is not
the correctness of the expert’s conclusions
b u t the soundness of his m eth o d o lo g y ”
(Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1318).
The Supreme Court emphasized that sci
ence is defined through its processes, not
through its product and that, as many leading
scientific organizations have held, science
consists not of “an encyclopedic body of
knowledge about the universe...but rather
represents a process for proposing and refin
ing theoretical explanations about the world
that are subject to further testing and refine
ment” (Daubert I, 113. S. Ct. 2786, 2795).
T herefore, as difficult and complex as
Daubert issues may be, analysis of them should
never stray from m ethods to conclusions,
from principles to punch line. However dubi
ous the conclusions of a witness, they should
remain admissible so long as they meet the
construct of the Daubert analysis.
RELIABILITY OF METHODOLOGY

No m atter how qualified the expert, testi
mony can be excluded under Daubert if the

expert fails to adhere to accepted methods in
reaching conclusions. In Smelser v. Norfolk
Southern Ry. Co. (105 F.3d 299 (6th Cir.
1997)), the Sixth Circuit held that expert tes
tim ony of a biom echanical engineer was
improperly admitted at trial because of his
unreliable methodology. Similarly, in Wintz By
and Through Wintz v. Northrop (110 F.3d 508
(7th Cir. 1997)), a toxicologist’s testimony was
excluded because his scientific knowledge
and m ethodology were held insufficient
under Daubert.
The Smelser and Wintz decisions point out
that experts not only need to have the requi
site qualifications in the relevant field of
study, but also must go about their tasks in
appropriate and conventional ways.
METHODOLOGY AND QUALIFICATIONS

The m andate of Daubert requires that the
Trial Court consider both the qualifications
and scientific m ethodology of proposed
experts. Recent federal cases illustrate that an
expert’s qualifications and methodology are
linked in d eterm ining w hether to adm it
expert testimony.
Liberality and flexibility in evaluating quali
fications must be the rule, and experts should
not be strictly confined to the narrow area of
their own practice. However, an expert can
not rest on his or her credentials alone as “the
e x p e rt’s bald assurance of validity is not
enough” to prove scientific reliability (Daubert
II, 43 F.3d at 1316).
Courts have recognized that an expert’s
qualifications and expertise can be circum
stantial evidence in determining whether the
und erly in g o p in io n s are reliable u n d e r
Daubert. In Estate of Bud Hill v. Conagra Poultry
Company (1997 WL538887 (N.D. GA)), the
Court, after carefully analyzing the expert’s
work including a careful review of regression
analyses and the law relating thereto, found
the expert’s m ethod to be sufficiently reli
able. In Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp. (33 F.3d
1116 (9th Cir. 1994)), the N inth Circuit
ruled that a toxicologist’s expert testimony
on the causal connection between breast
im plants and the disease suffered by the
plaintiff was admissible under Daubert. While
there was no solid body of epidemiological
data for the toxicologist to review, the Court
concluded that his testimony was reliable,
and therefore admissible, based on his quali
fication as “a recognized e x p e rt on the
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im m unological effects of silicone in the
human body.”
While the qualifications and expertise of
the expert can bolster the reliability of his or
her reasoning, it is important to note that a
precise matching of expertise and testimonial
subject matter is not required. Provided the
expert conclusions are derived by the scien
tific method, the lack of specialization in a
particular field, use of novel methodology, or
lack of supporting authority should affect only
the weight of the opinion and not the admissi
bility of the evidence. (McCullock v. H. B.
Fuller, 61 F.3d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir. 1995);
Quinton v. Farmland Indus. Inc., 928 F.2d 335
(10th Cir. 1991)).
T he inadm issibility o f fatally flawed
accounting testimony was aptly demonstrated
in Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2F.3D
183 (1993). T he action was b ro u g h t by
investors in a corporation against the account
ing firm of the corporation for aiding and
abetting securities fraud and common law
fraud. To prove the plaintiff s case, an accoun
tant was permitted to testify, over objection,
that the defendant accounting firm had vio
lated seven of the ten generally accepted audit
ing standards. This powerful testimony was
permitted by the Trial Court even though the
analysis by the expert failed to meet the requi
site methodology standards under Daubert.
The Circuit Court had little difficulty in find
ing that, among other errors, the Trial Court
erred in admitting such defective testimony:
Admitting Hassett’s ‘fairly simple pass’ into evi
dence just because he is an expert in account
ing is problematic, for Hassett conceded that he
did not employ the methodology that experts in
valuation find essential.... The Trial Judge did
not conduct a ‘preliminary assessment’ before
permitting Hassett to testify about his method.
Although District judges possess considerable
discretion in dealing with expert testimony...on
this record, the Court could not properly have
admitted Hassett’s valuation.

Because an exp ert’s qualifications and
methodologies are now routinely subject to
attack in Court, both counsel and experts
should work together to carefully select and
prepare experts to withstand these challenges.
In doing so, any specialty recognition that the
expert holds would, of course, be both useful
and persuasive in convincing a Trial Court
that the expert is qualified to testify. For
example, holding an Accredited in Business
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Valuation (ABV) from the AICPA would help
to elevate the special knowledge of a CPA in
the eyes of the Court and establish involve
ment and competency in this field.
DAUBERT'S APPLICATION TO NONSCIENTIFIC
EXPERT TESTIMONY

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
states that qualified expert testimony relating
to “scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge” is admissible if it will “assist a trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to deter
mine a fact in issue.” Therefore, the rule itself
is not limited to scientific testimony. Despite
the ru le’s unambiguous language, Circuit
Courts have split on whether the Daubert stan
dard, interpreting Rule 702, applies to nonsci
entific expert testimony. This confusion is
most likely a result of the majority’s failure to
address how Daubert should apply to “techni
cal or other specialized knowledge” (Daubert I,
509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (Rehnquist, C.J., concur
ring in part and dissenting in part)).
Several circuits have applied a modified
version of the Daubert factors when dealing
with nonscientific testimony. These courts rec
ognize that Daubert plays an important role in
ensuring reliability and, therefore, is instruc
tive in evaluating nonscientific expert testi
mony.
In Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., the
T h ird C ircuit C ourt found inadm issible
expert testimony relating to an alleged design
defect in a product liability action. Focusing
on the expert’s qualifications and underlying
methodology of the testing of forklifts, the
Court did not literally apply Daubert’s factors,
but rather relied on Daubert for the proposi
tion that “any and all” expert testimony must
be sufficiently reliable (Habecker, 36 F.3d 278,
289-90 (3d Cir. 1994)). In a subsequent deci
sion, the Court stated that as to expert testi
mony based on “technical or other specialized
knowledge,” Daubert “tests are helpful to assist
us in our consideration of the expertise in
question” (United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d
844, 850 (3d Cir. 1995)). In addressing the
reliability prong of Daubert, the Court noted
the expert’s qualifications and the standard
methodology underlying her testimony. The
Fifth Circuit Court also requires that nonsci
entific expert testimony have some “indicia”
of reliability to satisfy Daubert.
The First Circuit, noting its gatekeeping
function under Daubert, has found nonscien
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tific expert testimony admissible as long as it is
sufficiently reliable. In determining the relia
bility of such testimony in the context of bank
ing and commercial transactions, the Court
looked to the underlying methodology and
qualifications. (See, for example, United States
v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1996) and Den
Norske Bank v. First National Bank of Boston, 75
F. 3d 49 (1st Cir. 1996).)
In U.S. v. Kayne, for example, the admissi
bility of testimony concerning the value of
rare coins was considered. The Trial Court
had admitted the testimony and the Circuit
Court held the admission to be proper under
the circumstances:
The defendants com plain...that the opinions
were not based on consistent standards and
were subject to factors of taste and assessment
of the market and that the experts often dis
agreed among themselves. This is not unusual.
T hese m atters are properly the subject of
searching cross-examination.

In all of these cases, the Court notes that its
gatekeeping function under Daubert is limited
to determining the reliability of the expert evi
dence, and that it is the role of the jury, not
the judge, to give that evidence as m uch
weight as it deserves. Therefore, in determin
ing the admissibility of nonscientific expert
testimony, it is important to focus on the rea
soning and methodology employed, rather
than the conclusions reached.
Several Circuits have held that Daubert’s
principles are limited to scientific testimony.
The N inth Circuit, which established the
Daubert factors, has declined to extend these
factors to nonscientific expert testimony. In
United States v. Cordoba, the Court did not
apply Daubert to a government agent’s expert
testimony on the modus operandi of narcotics
traffickers. The Court reasoned that “Daubert
applies only to the admission of scientific testi
mony” (104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997)).
The Second Circuit has also interpreted
Daubert as applying only to scientific evidence.
In Iacobelli Construction, Inc. v. County of
Monroe, the Court held that nonscientific evi
dence did “not present the kind of ‘j unk sci
e n c e ’ problem s th a t Daubert m ean t to
address” and that, therefore, reliance on
Daubert in determ ining the admissibility of
such testimony was “misplaced” (32 F.3d 19,
25 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Similarly in Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc.
the Court held that an accountant’s expert

testimony did not have to meet the Daubert
standard, as “that case (Daubert) dealt specifi
cally with the admissibility of scientific evi
dence” (13 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993)).
In these Circuits, the Courts have applied a
more traditional Rule 702 analysis in deter
m ining the admissibility of nonscientific
expert testimony, focusing on the issues of rel
evancy, qualifications, and helpfulness to the
jury. As the Tenth Circuit noted:
We do not believe Daubert completely changes
our traditional analysis under Rule 702. Instead,
Daubert sets out additional factors the Trial
Court should consider under Rule 702 if an
expert witness offers testimony based upon a particular
methodology or technique (Compton, 82 F.3d at
1519; emphasis added).

In determining the
admissibility o f
nonscientific expert
testimony, it is
important to focus
on the reasoning
and methodology
employed, rather
than the
conclusions
reached.

THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH: THE KELLY-FRYE
RULE

The California Supreme Court rejected the
Daubert approach in determining the reliabil
ity and admissibility of new scientific tech
niques (People v. Leahy, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663,
882 P.2d 321 (1994)). Instead, the California
Court has continued to apply the Kelly-Frye
“general acceptance” standard. (See “Meeting
the ‘G eneral A cce p ta n c e ’ S tan d ard in
California” on page 6.)
In the 1976 People v. Kelly decision, the
California Supreme Court unanimously con
firmed its adherence to Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Kelly-Frye
rule states that in order for expert testimony
based upon application of new scientific tech
nology to be admissible, the proponent must
sufficiently establish reliability of method, usu
ally by expert testimony, that the witness fur
nishing the testimony is properly qualified as
an expert to give an opinion on the subject,
and that correct scientific procedures were
used. Additionally, the proponent must estab
lish reliability of the new scientific technique
by proving that the technology has gained
“general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs” (People v. Kelly, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 144, 148, 549 P.2d 1240 (1976)).
Similar to Daubert, the California courts
also require that the expert testimony be help
ful to the jury. The e x p e rt’s testim ony is
admissible if it is “related to a subject that is
sufficiently beyond the com m on experi
e n c e...a n d will assist the trier of fact” in
resolving the issues (California Evid. Code
§ 801).
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In Leahy, the Court reiterated the policy
behind this “cautious” and “conservative”
approach of Kelly-Frye. While not perfect, the
standard is necessary to keep unreliable evi
dence from a jury that may unwittingly give
too much weight to the evidence of a scien
tific device that suggests infallibility, but is
actually unproven (Leahy, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
670; People v. Webb, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 798,
862 P.2d. 779 (1993)). Therefore, “California
Courts have long been willing to forego
admission of ‘new’ scientific methods used to
detect, analyze, or produce evidence absent a
credible threshold showing that ‘the perti

nent scientific community no longer views
them as experimental or of dubious validity’”
(Webb, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798).
CONCLUSION

As with most aspects of trial, proper prepara
tion leads to successful outcomes. Careful
e x p e rt selection, coupled with in-depth
research and analysis, capped by an indepen
dent witness to verify the methodology and
reliability of the technique, will enhance the
chances of overcoming a Daubert challenge.
Once overcome, evidence is heard and con
sidered by the trier of fact. pT-j

analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Under this standard, the

Meeting the "General Acceptance"
Standard in California

role of the jury is to examine the expert evidence and give
the proper weight considering the competing opinions prof

“‘General acceptance’ [of a theory or methodology] does not

fered and support for each.

require unanimity, a consensus of opinion, or even majority
support by the scientific community.” (Leahy, 34 Cal. Rptr.

It is important to note that Kelly-Frye only applies to that

2d at 671.) The Kelly-Frye rule also does not require that the

“limited class of expert testimony that is based in whole or

Court determine whether the procedure in question is reliable
as a matter of scientific fact. Rather, under Kelly-Frye, the

part, on a technique, process, or theory that is new to sci
ence, and even more so the law” (Leahy, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

admissibility and reliability questions regarding new scientific

674). The Kelly-Frye standard does not apply to expert opin
ion testimony. Therefore, experts may testify as to their opin

techniques are settled by those persons most qualified to
assess their validity. (Id. at 672.)

ions or “point of view” as long as it is not based upon new
scientific technology. Experts may proffer opinion testimony

To meet the “general acceptance” standard, the Court deter
mines, through expert testimony and the relevant technical
or professional literature, whether the new scientific method
is accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community
and whether scientists in either number or experience pub

based upon their education, training, clinical experience, and
expertise in the field. (See for example, West v. Johnson &
Johnson Products Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 44 6 (1985) in
which the expert offered opinion testimony that, based upon

licly oppose the technique as unreliable (People v. Axell, 1

his experience and medical assessment, plaintiff’s toxic
shock syndrome was caused by defendant’s tampons.) The

Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 421-22 (1992)).

jury is then free to give the expert’s opinion as much weight

In Leahy, the Court found that it was insufficient that law

as the opinion and expert warrant in deciding the case.

enforcement had widely accepted and used horizontal gaze

If the expert’s opinion is based upon a new scientific tech

testing to determine intoxication. Rather, the Court stated

nique, the proponent should submit published writing in

that “‘general acceptance’ under Kelly means a consensus
drawn from a typical cross-section of the relevant, qualified

scholarly treatises and journals for the Court’s review.
Presenting another expert witness to testify as to the gen

scientific community” (Leahy, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679).

eral acceptance of the technique will also help to overcome

Therefore, in order for expert testimony based on new scien
tific theory to be admissible under Kelly, the debate in the
scientific community must first be carried out. This conserva
tive approach can prevent the admissibility of novel scientific

any challenges. It is important to remember, however, that
the trial courts must consider not just the quantity but also
the quality of the experts who support or oppose the tech

theory or technique that is relevant and helpful to the jury’s

opposition by persons minimally qualified to state an authori

determination of the issues involved. Daubert, on the other

tative opinion is of little value....” (Leahy, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

hand, is a more flexible standard, which considers accep

678-79).

tance by the scientific community only one of many factors.

nique as reliable. Merely presenting a “majority support or

And novel theories are admissible under Daubert even if rec

Therefore, as in overcoming the Daubert challenge, the selec
tion of experts properly qualified in the relevant field is para

ognized only by a minority of the scientific community. What

mount.

constitutes a “minority” is a matter that must necessarily be
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IS THERE STILL A
SIZE PREMIUM?
Michael Annin, CFA, and Dominic Falaschetti, CFA

OVERVIEW

In recent years, small capitalization stocks
have been under-perform ing (providing
lower overall returns) large capitalization
stocks. Does this mean that there really is no
size premium?
It should be no surprise that small capital
ization stocks under-perform large capitaliza
tion stocks for a given period because of the
serial correlation that has been observed in
the size prem ium historically. While the
under-perform ance of small capitalization
stocks over the more recent periods might
make for interesting conversation, it does not
mean that there has been a fundamental shift
in the markets that would eliminate the size
premium.
DEFINITION OF THE SIZE PREMIUM

Historically, small capitalization stocks have
had both greater risk and greater returns
than large capitalization stocks. In other
words, as an asset class, small capitalization
stocks not only are riskier than large capital
ization stocks, but also have provided greater
re tu rn s. Investors have g en erally been
rewarded for taking the additional risk inher
ent in small stocks.
Ibbotson Associates measures the small
stock prem ium using data back to 1926.
Other studies such as that done by Grabowski
and King in 1995 have examined the small
stock premium over shorter periods, but have
arrived at similar results.
The identification of the size premium is
significant because it can have a m aterial
impact on the discount rate and therefore
have a material impact on the overall valua
tion derived for a company. In this article, we
refer to small capitalization stocks as micro
capitalization stocks which represent the
smallest 20 percent of stocks on the New York
Stock Exchange. Large capitalization stocks
are represented by the S&P 500. The current
edition of Ibbotson Associates’ Stocks, Bonds,
Bills and Inflation (SBBI) Yearbook lists a size
prem ium for micro-capitalization stocks of
3.47 percent. SBBI also shows that for very

small companies, those falling in the tenth
decile of the New York Stock Exchange, the
size premium can approach 5.78 percent. A
350 basis point addition to a discount rate
will almost always have a material impact on
the overall valuation derived from the dis
counted cash flow analysis.
Because the small stock prem ium has
existed historically, it is assum ed th at it
should be applied to discount rates for small
com panies for valuation purposes. This
implicitly assumes that the appraiser expects
the small stock premium to continue indefi
nitely.
REVIEW OF RECENT STATISTICS

If one measures small stocks as the bottom
20 percent of the New York Stock Exchange
and large stocks as the S&P 500, small com
pany stocks have actually under-performed
large company stocks over the past several
years. This has led some observers to ques
tion the validity of the small stock p re 
m ium —effectively reducing the discount
rates for small companies. For the remain
der of this article, we will use this New York
Stock Exchange data to rep re sen t small
company stocks. For simplicity, we will also
use a simple, arithmetic difference for calcu
lating the small stock premium. These two
aspects differ slightly from the size prem i
ums and small stock premium presented in
Ibbotson’s Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation
Yearbook.
NO SURPRISE IN RECENT STATISTICS

As the table on page 8 shows, for the twentyyear period of 1977-1996, small company
stocks have actually under-performed large
company stocks for ten of those twenty years.
Does this mean that the nature of the stock
market has changed and that small compa
nies do not deserve a size premium?
The answer to this question is an emphatic
“no.” For several reasons, we should not be
surprised by the performance of small stocks
over the more recent past.
RISK

History tells us that small com panies are
riskier than large companies. To compensate
investors in small companies for taking on
this additional risk, small companies have
provided higher returns to their investors
than large companies. It is important to note

M ich ael Annin, CFA, is
vice president and Dominic
Falaschetti, CFA, is senior
con sultant a t Ibbotson
Associates, Chicago, IL
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The identification
o f the size premium
is significant
because it can have
a material impact
on the discount
rate and therefore
have a material
impact on the
overall valuation
derived fo r a
company.

that the risk-return profile is over the long
term. If small companies did not provide
higher long-term returns, investors would be
more inclined to invest in the less risky stocks
of large companies.
The increased risk faced by investors in
small stocks is quite real. The long-term
expected return is quite different than short
term expected returns for any asset class.
Investors in small capitalization stocks should
expect losses and periods of under-perfor
mance.
Exhibit 1 (opposite page) shows the stan
dard deviation of large capitalization and
small capitalization stocks along with the
small stock premium on a rolling sixty month
basis. It is clear from the graph that on a sixty
m onth basis the standard deviations of all
three have been declining. However, reduc
tions in sta n d a rd deviation (risk) have
occurred in the past when measured over a
short time span such as sixty months. There is
no evidence to suggest that this reduction in
standard deviation will continue or that the
market dynamics have changed, effectively
reducing the long-term expected returns of
small company investors.
SERIAL CORRELATION

Serial correlation, also known as autocorrela
tion, in a return series describes the extent to
which the return in one period is related to
the return in the next period. A serial corre
lation of zero indicates that a series is ran
dom and cannot be predicted. A serial corre-

EXHIBIT 2

Serial Correlation
Large Company Stocks

-0 .0 1

Small Company Stocks

0.12

Equity Risk Premium

0.00

Small Stock Premium

0.36

lation of near one implies that a series is
quite predictable from one period to the
next. Serial correlation statistics are used to
spot trends in data.
It is possible to calculate a serial correla
tion for return series like large capitalization
stocks and small capitalization stocks. It is
also possible to calculate a serial correlation
for derived series such as the equity risk pre
mium and the small stock premium.
Exhibit 2 shows the serial correlation
for large and small company stocks as well
as the equity risk premium and small stock
prem ium . It is in te re stin g to n o te th a t
while the serial correlations, as calculated
by Ibbotson Associates, of large company
stocks, sm all com pany stocks, an d the
equity risk prem ium are at or near zero,
the serial correlation of the small stock
premium is 0.36.
A serial correlation of 0.36 for the small
stock premium is significant because it indi
cates that the small company premium has

TOTAL RETURN — 1 9 7 7 -1 9 9 6
Year

Year

Large Cap

Micro Cap

Large Cap

Micro Cap

1977

-7.18%

20.02%

1987

5.23%

-8.97%

1978

6.56%

19.40%

1988

16.81%

18.91%

1979

18.44%

40.72%

1989

31.49%

2.36%

1980

32.42%

29.63%

1990

-3.17%

-35.98%

1981

-4.91%

14.04%

1991

30.55%

42.39%

1982

21.41%

32.98%

1992

7.67%

20.59%

1983

22.51%

48.06%

1993

9.99%

15.97%

1984

6.27%

-2.60%

1994

1.31%

-0.76%

1985

32.16%

29.08%

1995

37.43%

20.96%

1986

18.47%

6.32%

1996

23.07%

21.91%

Source: Ibbotson Associates
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a tendency to move in cycles. (The standard
erro r for the above serial correlations is
0.12)
Exhibit 3 shows the excess returns of small
stocks over large stocks for th e years
1926-1996. This graph shows the perfor
mance of small company stocks in compari
son to large com pany stocks over an
extended period. While there are periods
when small company stock excess returns
appear to be random, there are also periods
when small stock excess returns follow a
trend or move in cycles. Because of the serial
correlation that exists in the small stock pre
mium, it is not surprising that we have experi
enced a period when these excess returns
have been negative.

EXHIBIT 1

TWENTY YEAR HISTORY

While we would argue that it is appropriate to
measure the size premium over the entire
period from 1926 to present, some practition
ers insist that the most recent past is the best
indicator of the future. Exhibit 4 shows the
excess returns of small capitalization stocks
over large capitalization stocks on a rolling
twenty year basis. In other words, the data
point to the far right of the graph represents
small stock excess returns from 1977 through
1996. The data point to the far left of the
graph represents small stock excess returns
from 1926 through 1945.
This graph shows that there has been no
twenty-year tim e fram e in which excess
returns on small company stocks over large
com pany stocks have been negative.
Furthermore, while the excess returns for the
most recent time period are low, they have
actually been lower at other points in history.
Based on this graph, it is difficult to say that
markets have changed and investors in small
com pany stocks will n o t achieve excess
returns in future periods.

EXHIBIT 3
Year-by-Year
Excess Return of Small Stocks O ver Large Stocks
140

EXHIBIT 4
Twenty-Year Rolling Period
Excess Returns of Small Stocks O ver Large Stocks

CONCLUSION

While it is true that small capitalization stocks
have been under-performing large capitaliza
tion stocks in recent years, there is no reason
to believe that there has been a material shift
in the market. In fact, given the risk level
inherent in small capitalization stocks and
the serial correlation present in the size pre
mium data history, a period of under-perfor
mance should be expected. CE

20-Year Period Ending
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in Thailand. However, no one
recorded the solutions and best
suppliers during the first project,
and the m anager who headed
the Thai project had moved to
Europe. The cost of having to
Eva M. Lang, CPA
obtain this information for a sec
ond time put the company’s bid
“We now know the source of wealth is something specifically
m onths behind those of m ore
human: knowledge. I f we apply knowledge to tasks we already
savvy competitors.
know how to do, we call it productivity. I f we apply knowledge
Problems resulting from cor
to tasks that are new and different, we call it innovation.
porate amnesia aren’t limited to
Only knowledge allows us to achieve those two goals. ”
large multinational firms. In fact,
Peter Drucker.
the consequences are greater in
the relative sense for smaller companies,
Although Peter Drucker coined the term
such as CPA firms. Small service firms tend
knowledge worker in the 1960s, it was not until
to be very dependent upon the expertise of a
the 1990s that the concept of knowledge
few workers, but have less time and fewer
management emerged. Knowledge manage
resources with which to capture and docu
ment is the process of capturing a company’s
ment this knowledge.
collective expertise and experience and then
distributing it for the greatest payoff. Think
Com panies that downsized workers in
recent years are turning to knowledge man
of it as the organized process through which
agem ent practices to recover the years of
companies attempt to become smarter.
organizational memory and intelligence that
The increase in interest in knowledge
were
lost when experienced workers left.
m anagem ent was spurred by the explosive
Nilly Ostro points out that companies that
growth of information sources such as the
would never consider offering their fixed
Internet. In 1996, U.S. businesses paid con
assets for free, have liquidated their intangi
sultants $1.5 billion for knowledge manage
ble assets at zero return.
m ent advice, and that will increase to $5.0
billion annually by 2001, according to the
KNOWLEDGE AFFECTS COMPANY VALUE
Gartner Group (Stamford, CT), a technol
Another impetus for the implementation of
ogy consulting firm. A 1997 study by the
knowledge management practices has been
D elphi C onsulting G roup (Boston, MA)
evidence of the dollar value of knowledge
showed that 28 percen t of organizations
capital expressed in the valuations of tech
already use knowledge m anagem ent, and
nology or intelligence firms. Industry consul
another 70 percent plan to use it in 1998.
tant Paul Strassmann views it this way, “When
M odern knowledge m anagement got its
you sell a company at a high multiple of its
start in the Big Six consulting firms, but now
book value, you monetize an estimate of its
companies in nearly every industry are recog
knowledge capital.” As an example, he cites
nizing the value of intellectual capital and
Apple’s purchase of NeXT for $400 million,
are initiating programs to capture and man
which b o u g h t Apple alm ost no tangible
age it.
assets. O ther examples abound, including
Netscape’s IPO which immediately gave a
CURING CORPORATE AMNESIA
company with few assets and no earnings a
Knowledge management can be the cure for
market value of nearly $140 million.
corporate amnesia. Companies that fail to
Clearly knowledge is important and has a
document and draw from past experiences
real dollar value, so how can companies best
are constantly “reinventing the wheel,” often
manage this im portant asset? Despite the
at great financial cost.
impression that knowledge management is a
Nilly Ostro, a knowledge m anagem ent
technology issue, implementing Lotus Notes
industry observer, relates the story of a large
or another groupware program is not the
multinational company bidding for an infra
way to start. Psychological and organizational
structure project in Asia. Several years ear
issues must be addressed before technologi
lier, the company dealt with several of the
cal solutions can be entertained.
same sourcing issues when building a plant

MANAGING THE FIRM'S
KNOWLEDGE
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FOSTERING A CULTURE OF SHARING

K now ledge m a n a g e m e n t p rac tic e s are
doomed to failure unless companies foster a
culture that supports the sharing of informa
tion. Apparently a great many of America’s
new knowledge workers were absent from
kindergarten the day sharing was taught.
Employees’ desire to hoard information is
the biggest hurdle to overcome in imple
menting successful knowledge management
practices. This is understandable, as organi
zations have traditionally not rewarded the
sharing of knowledge. Workers could harm
their own chances for advancement if they
put valuable information in the hands of co
workers who might attract attention for a job
well done.
These concerns must be addressed before
implementing new practices. Amoco spent
m ore than a year introducing knowledge
m anagem ent concepts to the organization
before introducing new technologies. The
focus during this period was on making the
sharing and use of knowledge instinctive
among the workforce.
The only way to foster a successful cul
ture of knowledge sharing is to have the
support of senior m anagem ent. Buckman
Laboratories of Memphis is often cited for
having a successful knowledge sharing pro
gram. A major factor in the success of this
p ro g ra m is th e in v o lv e m e n t of Vice
C hairm an and owner Bob Buckman. He
personally scans all messages within the
company’s knowledge management system.
Buckman gives laptop computers to the 150
m ost knowledge-sharing employees each
year. At E rn st & Young, b o n u se s a n d
employee performance evaluations are tied
to the num ber of contributions made to the
company’s knowledge databases.
MORE THAN TECHNOLOGY NEEDED

Once a culture that encourages sharing of
information has been established, the focus
should be on existing systems that could be
used for inform ation sharing. Every com
pany already has inform al networks and
other knowledge-sharing systems. At the out
set, a know ledge m an ag em en t program
should identify these systems before rushing
o u t to p u rch a se the late st softw are.
T echnology is n o t the solution, b u t the
means.

Resources for Information About Knowledge
Management
Internet Links to Knowledge Management Information
Knowledge, Inc.
http://www.webcom.com/quantera/welcome.html
KM Metazine
http://w ww .ktic.com /topic6/km .htm
World Wide Web Virtual Library-Knowledge Management
http://www.brint.com /km
Guidelines for Developing an Information Strategy, Coopers & Lybrand
http://back.niss.ac.uk/education/jisc/pub/infstrat
Intranet/Knowledge Management Resource Center
http://www.uni-hohenheim.de/~miepple/ikcenter.html
Knowledge Management Forum
http://www.km-forum.org
International Knowledge Management Network
http://kmn.cibit.hvu.nl/index.html
Ernst and Young’s Knowledge Based Business Page
http://www.ey.com/knowledge/default.htm
KPMG Knowledge Management Report
http://www.kpmg.co.uk/uk/services/manage/powknow/index.htm
Print Resources
Cohen, Don et al. Managing Knowledge for Business Success: A
Conference Report. New York: The Conference Board, 1997.
Davenport, Thomas H. “Ten Principles of Knowledge Management and
Four Case Studies,” Knowledge and Process Management (Vol. 4, No. 3,
1997): 1 8 7 -2 0 8 .
Hibbard, Justin, and Karen M. Carrillo. “Knowledge Revolution,”
InformationWeek (January 5 ,1 9 9 8 ): 4 9 -5 4 .
McGee, James, and Laurence Prusak. Managing Information Strategies.
Ernst & Young Information Management Series. (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1993).
Pascarella, Perry. “Harnessing Knowledge,” Management Review
(October 1997): 3 7 -4 0 .

Clara O ’Dell, president of the American
Productivity & Quality Center, puts it this
way: “While technology can help share the
knowledge stored in the minds of employ
ees, customers, and suppliers, without the
necessary complementary changes in man
agement practice and culture, you may build
it, but they won’t necessarily come.”
Tom Elsenbrook, partner in charge of
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knowledge services for Andersen Consulting,
has developed a seven-step checklist for
im plem enting a knowledge m anagem ent
program. Note that technology is not men
tioned until step six:
1. Appoint a chief knowledge officer. This
executive can create a knowledge manage
m ent strategy that is linked to your com
pany’s objectives.
2. Strengthen upper management’s com
mitment by showing top executives success
ful knowledge management at other compa
nies.
3. Integrate knowledge management into
core work processes. Make knowledge cap
ture a step in key processes.
4. Create a culture of trust and learning.
Make employees feel comfortable sharing
knowledge.
5. Create discipline in the organization to
ensure quality of content.
6. Deploy technologies for creating knowl
edge and speeding the pace of innovation.
7. Establish methods for measuring the
benefits of knowledge management.
SOLUTIONS CAN BE SIMPLE

Granted, technology is an im portant part
of a knowledge m anagem ent system. It is
imperative to have a m ethod for sharing

knowledge. However, highly specialized,
expensive technology is n o t always the
answer. Buckman Laboratories, which has
won awards for its highly touted internal
knowledge sharing system, K ’Netix, uses a
technology th at is no t cutting edge, but
th a t is in ex p e n siv e a n d cost effective:
CompuServe bulletin boards set up on the
company’s intranet.
Lotus Notes and other groupware systems
can be successful if users receive the neces
sary su p p o rt and en co u rag em en t to use
them. But many employees find it difficult to
locate information in groupware programs
and give up using them. Some firms have put
in place extensive Lotus Notes databases, only
to find that employees resort to using e-mail
to ask questions. Many in the knowledge
management field, including Marc Demarst,
Sequent C om puter’s chief knowledge offi
cer, think that intranets, with their low-cost
architecture, open standards, and browserin te rfa c e , co u ld becom e the sta n d a rd
medium for knowledge sharing companies.
Almost every firm can benefit from imple
menting good knowledge management prac
tices. The key to success is a thoughtful and
well planned program that com plem ents
existing systems and has the support of man
agement. CE

Mark Your Calendars!
Several AICPA conferences of interest to CPA Expert readers are scheduled for Summer and Fall
1998:
Bankruptcy Conference

Advanced Litigation Services Conference

July 9 -1 0 ,1 9 9 8

October 1 5 - 1 6 , 1998

JW Marriott, Washington, DC

The Buttes Resort, Tempe, Arizona

Fraud Conference

Business Valuation Conference

September 1 7 - 1 8 , 1998

November 1 5 -1 7 ,1 9 9 8

(Optional session September 16)

Loews Miami Beach, Florida

Caesars Palace, Las Vegas, Nevada

For information about these conferences, contact AICPA Conference Registration 800-862-4272.
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50% + 50% ≠ 100%
James R. Hitchner, CPA, ABV

50% + 50% ≠ 100%. No it’s not new math!
Clearly the Tax Court felt that 50 percent +
50 percent did not equal 100 percent in the
Estate of Thomas A. Fleming, et. al. v.
Commissioner Of Internal Revenue. In Tax
Court Memo. 1997-484, issued October 27,
1997, the Court determined that a 27 per
cent discount applied to a 50 percent inter
est in a closely held company.
The decedent died on November 22,
1991, which was the valuation date. He
owned a 50-percent interest in the common
stock of B & W Financial Corporation of
Longview, Inc. (B & W Longview). The
decedent’s spouse owned the other 50-percent interest. B & W Longview made small
loans (trade notes receivables) that were
regulated by the Office of Consumer Credit
of the State of Texas. B & W Longview also
had several demand notes.
The company’s balance sheet on the val
uation date was as follows:
Cash

$ 7 6 0 ,9 5 3

Trade notes receivable (Gross)

1,012,177

Less discount for bad debts
Trade notes receivable (Net)
Nondepreciable assets
Demand loans

-1 0 1 ,2 1 7
910,960
75,323
652,139

Other assets

22,630

Total assets

$2,422,005

Total liabilities
Stockholders Equity

-2 5 3 ,1 6 6
$2,168,839

PRIOR TRANSACTIONS

Prior to his death, the decedent partici
pated in several transactions of companies
similar to B & W Longview. The transac
tions included a 50-percent interest pur
chased in 1987, which gave the decedent
100-percent control. The seller was not
related to the decedent. The price was
determined as book value plus a 23-percent
premium on the trade notes receivable. In

1989, the decedent sold his 100-percent
interest to an unrelated party, priced as
book value plus a 15-percent premium
on the trade notes receivable.
In 1991, the decedent sold a 100-per
cent interest in several companies to unre
lated parties for book value plus a 23-per
cent prem ium on the gross trade notes
receivable. Two of the transactions were for
100-percent control. The other transaction
was of a 50-percent interest but gave control
to the buyer, who already owned the other
50-percent interest.
The transaction data presented above
was a focal point for the Court in this case.
A thorough understanding of such transac
tions is critically important when determin
ing both the applicability and magnitude of
various discounts.

EXPERT

Opinion

VALUES

Both sides retained experts, both of whom
originally presented two valuation methods
under the market approach: “In applying
that approach, each of those experts used a
combination of the transaction method and
the market multiple or guideline company
method (market multiple method) in order
to arrive at his opinion of that value.”
The Estate filed an estate tax return on
August 7, 1992 with a value for decedent’s
50-percent interest in B & W Longview at
$1,000,000. Around November 17, 1993,
the Estate filed an amended return with a
new value of $726,000. At trial the Estate’s
expert further modified his report, claiming
a value of $604,777.
The IRS, however, claimed at trial that
the value was $1,100,000, which is 82 per
cent higher than the Estate’s value.
TAXPAYER'S EXPERT

The Estate retained Richard P. Bernstein,
President of Bernstein, Phalon & Conklin, a
business valuation firm. Bernstein modified
his market multiple method and gave equal
weight to both his methods “...because he
did not believe that either method alone pro
duced what he considered to be an accurate
estimate of the fair market value on the valu
ation date of the stock interest in question.”
Transaction Method
In his transaction method, he relied upon
the similar transactions entered into by the

James R. Hitchner, CPA,
ABV, a contributing edi
to r, is a Principal w ith
Phillips Hitchner Group,
Inc. Atlanta, GA.
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decedent in 1987, 1989, and 1991. As such,
he started with book value, added a 23-percent premium on the trade notes receivable
and multiplied this sum by the 50-percent
ownership interest. This resulted in a pre
discount value of $1,200,801.
Market Multiple Method
In his modified market multiple method,
Bernstein relied upon three publicly traded
guideline companies. His application of
these companies resulted in a pre-discount
value of $660,050. The Court concluded
that the results were unreliable and ignored
Bernstein’s opinion of value based on this
method: “Mr. Bernstein did not explain in
his report or adequately explain at trial why
the th ree guideline com panies th at he
chose were comparable to B & W Longview
on the valuation date and why he selected
only three publicly traded companies as
guideline companies.”
Bernstein averaged his two results of
$1,200,801 and $660,050. Given the huge
difference in value between the two meth
ods, a better explanation was indeed in
order. Furthermore, the market multiple
method using public companies indicated a
value, prior to discounts, substantially under
book value. Although this can happen in
certain circumstances, it appears odd here.

additional 10-percent to 15-percent pre
mium on the demand loans. He then took
the 50-percent interest of the decedent and
concluded a pre-discount value range of
$1,222,222 to $1,248,889.
The Court “...found Mr. Harrell’s testi
mony about the propriety of such a pre
mium to be tentative and unconvincing.
A ccordingly, we shall n o t accep t Mr.
Harrell’s opinion that a premium should be
applied to the demand loans.”
Market Multiple Method
After he prepared his report but before the
trial, Harrell “...discovered deficiencies in
the data...on which he relied in applying
the market multiple m ethod” and testified
that the results were unreliable. The Court
agreed, stating that “...we shall not give any
weight to those results in determining the
fair m arket value of the stock interest in
question.”
Discounts
Harrell applied a 10-percent minority dis
count but did not apply a discount for lack
of marketability. The Court was “not con
vinced that Mr. Harrell was correct in not
applying any lack-of-marketability discount
in valuing the stock interest in question.”
COURT'S OPINION

Discounts
Bernstein averaged the two results under
his two methods and then applied a com
bined discount for lack of control and lack
of marketability of 35 percent.
IRS'S EXPERT

The IRS’s expert, Monty L. H arrell, was
em ployed by the IRS as an econom ist.
Harrell also believed that a “...weighted
c o m b in a tio n of the m ark et-m u ltip le
method and the transaction method gener
ally would produce an accurate estimate
under the market approach of the fair mar
ket value on the valuation date of the stock
interest in question.”
Transaction Method
Harrell also analyzed the precedent transac
tions of the decedent. Like Bernstein, he
started with book value and added a pre
mium of 23 percent of the gross trade notes
receivable. However, Harrell then added an
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The Court dismissed the market multiple
method but expressed concern: “However...
we are not persuaded that the respective
results of Mr. Bernstein’s modified market
multiple method and Mr. Harrell’s market
multiple method are reliable. Consequently,
we are left with a deficient record from
which to determine the effect of the proper
a p p licatio n o f the m ark et m ultiple
m ethod....”
The Court did accept its own version of
the transaction method. They started with
book value and added a 23-percent pre
mium on the trade notes receivable. This
approach seems logical since both experts
also applied this method in the same way.
As for discounts, the Court agreed with
the taxpayer’s expert that a discount should
be applied for both lack of control and lack
of m arketability: “A m inority disco u n t
reflects the minority shareholder’s inability
to compel liquidation and thereby realize a
pro rata share of the corporation’s net asset
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were comparable to B & W Longview on the valuation date

Finding Fault with the Experts

and why he selected only three publicly traded companies
as guideline companies.” Consequently, the Court con

Although the Tax Court itself sometimes imposes limita

cluded that his results were unreliable and ignored his opin

tions on expert testimony and the strategy of the attorney

ion of value based on this method.

can som etim es affe c t th e presentation (for exam ple,
whether to redirect or not), Tax Court Memo. 1 9 9 7 -4 8 4
makes clear the need for valuers to thoroughly explain their
methods in arriving a t a conclusion of value. In tw o
instances in its opinion on Estate of Thomas A. Fleming, et
al., v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court faults
the taxpayer’s expert for failing to adequately explain his

The Court also faulted the taxpayer’s expert for failing to
explain why he selected a 35-percent discount for minority
interest and lack of marketability while the IRS’s expert
indicated a 10-percent minority interest. The taxpayer’s
expert “did not specify how much of the 35-percent com
bined discount that he applied was attributable to the fact
that decedent did not own a controlling stock interest in

methods.

B & W Longview on the valuation date. On brief, petitioner,
One instance concerns the selection of guideline compa

who has the burden of proof, does not insist that a minority

nies. In using the market multiple method, the taxpayer’s

discount in excess of 10 percent be applied in this case.”

expert “did not explain in his report or adequately explain
at trial why the three guidelines companies that he chose

value. A discount for lack of marketability
reflects the fact that there is no ready mar
ket for the stock of a closely held corpora
tion.”
Since the IRS’s expert indicated a dis
count of 10 percent for minority interest
and the taxpayer’s expert did not allocate
his combined discount of 35 percent for a
m inority interest, the C ourt seem ed to
accept 10 percent: “On brief, petitioner,
who has the burden of proof, does not insist
that a minority discount in excess of 10 per
cent be applied in this case.”
On the lack of marketability, the IRS’s
position was that it did not apply since the
underlying transaction m ethod involved
closely held interests with no ready market.
As such, the lack of m ark etab ility was
already re fle c te d in the prices paid.
Although the Court agreed in general with
the IRS’s position, it disagreed with its spe
cific application in this case. The Court
opined that two of the transactions were for
100 percent and that the third transaction
gave the buyer 100 percent: “On the record
before us, we find that there was even less of
a ready market for decedent’s 50-percent
stock interest in B & W Longview than there
was for the stock interests sold in the prece
dent transactions.”
T he C o u rt’s o p in io n o f value was
$875,000 for the 50-percent interest after
the application of discounts for lack of mar

ketability and for lack of control. Although
a specific amount for the discount was not
mentioned, it appears to be approximately
27 percent. When applied sequentially, this
indicates a 10-percent discount for lack of
control and a 19-percent discount for lack
of marketability.
CONCLUSION

Most practitioners agree that, all o th er
things being equal, a 100-percent control
ling interest is worth more than a 50-percent
interest. As such, if you rely upon the trans
action method which includes 100-percent
controlling interest, and you are valuing an
interest that is less than full control, some
discount is usually appropriate. Although a
50-percent interest is not really a minority
interest, it lacks control. In a 50-50 owner
ship situation, neither 50-percent owner can
act without the other 50-percent owner’s
permission. Each can veto the desires of the
other 50-percent owner, which is a step up
in rights from a pure m inority position.
Although there is no hard data on discounts
for a 50-percent interest, most practitioners
agree that the discounts are usually less than
those applied to a minority interest of less
than 50 percent. It is quite refreshing to see
the Court take the time to analyze transac
tions as they pertain to control versus minor
ity interest. CE

15

CPAExpert

T
IP
of the Issue

W in te r 1 9 9 8

AVOIDING THE EVOLUTION FROM
OBJECTIVE INVESTIGATOR TO
ADVOCATE WITNESS
William C. Barrett III, CPA, CTP

An expert witness is an authority in a partic
ular field, industry, discipline, or profession
accepted by the court or arbitrator. The
expert’s task is to assist the court by evaluat
ing the facts of a case and rendering a sup
portable professional or technical opinion
about complex matters of cause and effect.
The court, of course, needs assurance of the
expert’s objectivity. This may be a problem
for the expert because the court, as well as
the opposing attorney may assume that
advocacy has supplanted the expert’s objec
tivity. Consider, for example, the following
characterization of valuation experts by
Judge David Schwartz, when of the U.S.
Court of Claims:
The trier must first judge the qualifications of
the opposing experts, then try to understand
their presentations, pass on their sincerity
and credibility, and finally choose between
opposing conclusions. Throughout, there is
the uneasy doubt as to an appropriate dis
count for partisanship. Have the witnesses,
both or one of them, anticipated a discount
by the trier and hiked their opinions twice,
once for discount and once for loyalty to their
client, or only once, or even not at all?

W illia m C. B a rre tt III,
CPA, CTP, practices in
Richmond, VA, and is a
Supreme Court Certified
Mediator in Virginia and
New York. He is a mem
ber
of
th e
A IC PA
L itig a tio n and Dispute
R e s o lu tio n
S e rv ic e s
S u bco m m ittee and the
Panel of Neutrals of the
A m eric a n A rb itra tio n
A s s o c ia tio n and th e
National Association of
Securities Dealers.
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Sometimes, the CPA expert must deal
not only with the c o u rt’s and the oppo
n e n t’s assumptions about their advocacy,
but also with the real difficulty of maintain
ing objectivity that is posed in some cases.
Conclusions about technical and profes
sional issues are sometimes based on proba
bility rather than certainty. The determina
tion of the value of closely held stock, for
example, is a m atter of judgm ent, rather
than just mathematics. In such instances,
the CPA expert needs to be particularly
careful to maintain objectivity and avoid
becoming an advocate for an unwarranted
p o sitio n o r conclusion. If th e e x p e rt
becomes an advocate for the underlying
goals of the case, his or her conduct will be
unethical.
A metamorphosis from objective witness

to advocate can happen during one of the
six segments of a litigation services engage
ment: engagement interview, investigation
process, attorney communications, report
ing, depositions, and testimony.
Perhaps the most critical stage is the
engagem ent interview. At this point, the
CPA need s to clarify the scope o f the
engagem ent and determ ine whether any
limitations have been set. Because of time
and m onetary constraints, for exam ple,
counsel may wish to limit the scope of the
expert’s involvement or make that involve
ment conditional in anticipation of expand
ing or curtailing the scope of the expert’s
involvement. As the case progresses, the
expert’s scope of involvement may change
from providing services as a consultant to
testifying as an expert witness. The CPA
needs to en su re th a t the scope o f the
engagement, including any changes, is doc
umented in the case file and that all expert
opinions offered fall within the scope of the
engagement.
While each of the six segments of a litiga
tion services engagement is a progression
built upon the prior area, the investigation
process is perhaps the key to keeping the
expert an objective witness. A strong, thor
oughly executed investigation gives the sup
port needed to withstand the pressures and
outright manipulations inherent in the rest
of the litigation process.
DATA ISSUES

As the investigation progresses, certain
issues can arise that make it difficult for the
CPA expert to keep the investigative process
objective. Attorneys and clients come to the
CPA with th e ir own view o f the facts.
Inadvertently or deliberately, they may pro
vide inaccurate inform ation or they may
w ithhold in fo rm atio n . This creates an
opportunity for opposing counsel upon
cross-exam ination to im peach even the
m ost seasoned expert witness. To avoid
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such impeachment, the CPA needs to rec
ognize that attorneys and their clients are
biased. The CPA needs to keep an open
mind and avoid reaching conclusions pre
maturely. For example, the CPA may use
the scientific method of forming a hypothe
sis. T hen the CPA carefully follows well
established investigative steps and develops
forms, procedures, and processes that will
ensure proving or disproving the hypothesis
and that he or she will not neglect or over
look critical data, or be taken in by inaccu
rate data.
Even after the CPA has thoroughly inves
tigated the facts of the case and has objec
tively reached a supportable conclusion, he
or she is still vulnerable to subtly shifting
from objective e x p e rt to advocate.
Sometimes, the expert’s conclusion can fall
within a range on a continuum of conclu
sions that at one end support the clientattorney’s goals and at the other end sup
port the opponent’s goals. Wherever the
CPA expert’s conclusion falls on that con
tinuum, he or she needs to return to the
data to be sure that it in fact supports that
view.
Communications between the attorney
and the CPA expert are necessary to ensure
that everyone on the team is aware of all
facts and the direction of the case. Such
communications also provide opportunities
for the expert to learn of new or contradic
tory data and to assess challenges to the
conclusions he or she has reached. At this
point, the expert needs to avoid becoming
attached to the original conclusion if it’s
attacked by the attorney or o th er team
members. Understandably, an expert who
has invested considerable time and effort in
reaching this conclusion may be reluctant
to change it. But the expert must maintain
an objective point of view, realistically assess
ing challenges to opinions and remaining
open to the possibility of flaws in the initial
approach. A change may or may not be war
ranted, depending on the supporting data.
Again, the expert needs to return to the
data to see which conclusion it best sup
ports.

ful, for example, when using a purchased
software program (for example, valuation
software) as part of the investigation to
reach a conclusion. The conclusion may be
subject to many variables unaccounted for
by the software, making the expert’s credi
bility vulnerable.
In general, the CPA expert can help to
avoid having testim ony im p e a ch e d by
reviewing the investigation carefully before
testifying. The CPA should review records of
time and research to make sure they agree
with the case file reports. The CPA should
also review the files to make sure his or her
conclusions are supported with documenta
tion.
Although the CPA expert can advocate
his or her position based on the findings of
an investigation, as an expert witness, he or
she must be objective whether or not those
findings support the goals being advocated
by the attorney. This objectivity is required
not only to provide services ethically, but
also to ensure attracting the right kind of
referral sources and clients. CE

In Upcoming Issues

▲ Tax P enalties Related to Valuation
Issues
▲ Identifying and Investigating Pyramid
and Ponzi Schemes
▲ Taxes, Inflation, and Discount Rates in
Computations and Awards
▲ Valuing Construction Companies
▲ M alpractice Concerns as an Expert
Witness

INVESTIGATIVE ISSUES

When an appropriate investigation is not
done, the expert’s entire opinion may be in
jeopardy. The CPA expert needs to be care
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Resources For CPA Experts

ABA LawLink (www.abanet.or/lawlink/home.thml)
Cornell’s Legal Information Institute (www.law.cornell.
edu)

WEBSITES

Venture Capital
Price Waterhouse (www.pc.com/vc/) lists hundreds of
recent venture capital investments, including the transac
tion amounts. The database identifies who is funding
what.
DataMerge Capital Resources (www.datamerge.com/
financing2.htm) provides articles and a database of ven
ture capitalists, along with its own line of tools and prod
ucts.
Yahoo Internet Life’s Web Wallet (www3.zdnet.com/
yil/content/depts/colum ns/951205.htm l) by Russell
Shaw features a column on venture capital with links that
include Yahoo’s Business and Economy Venture Capital
subdirectory, which lists about fifty underwriting firms.
Company Annual Reports
Reuters Money Net.com (www.moneynet.com)
In v e sto r’s Business Daily A nnual R ep o rt G allery
(www.reportgallery-.com/bigaz.htm)
Legal Research
The Complete Internet Researcher (www.aallnet.org/
products/crab/index.htm l) serves as a guide to legal
professionals who are doing research on the Internet.
Other books/websites devoted to assisting researchers
include:
How to Use the Internet for Legal Research by Find/SVP
(www.findsvp.com)
The Practical Litigator’s Guide to Internet Research (www.aliaba.org/aliaba/intro.htm )
Internet Guide for the Legal Researcher by Don MacLeod
(www.infosourcespub.com)
The Library of Congress Legislative Server THOMAS
(//thomas.loc.gov) tracks pending and new legislation.
V illanova Law S ch o o l’s F ed eral Web L ocator
law.vill.edu/fed-agency/fedwebloc.html) provides a com
prehensive list of federal Websites including all the fed
eral courts and case law.
U.S. State and T erritorial Laws (//la w .h o u se .g o v /
17.htm) and Piper Resources (www. piperinfo.com /
state/states.html) provide comprehensive listings of state
and local government and legal Web sites.
Current Case Law
Free access to case law, although of varying depths, is
provided at these Web sites:
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FindLaw (www.fmdlaw.com)
American Law Sources On-Line (www.lawsources.com/
also/usa.htm)
Versuslaw (www.versuslaw.com) provides fee-based full
text opinions from federal and state appellate courts.
Economic Information
Several sources of economic information are available in
print and in whole or in part on Web sites:
The Statistical Abstracts of the United States (www.census.
gov/stat_abstract) presents more than 1,400 tables and
graphs of statistics on social, economic, and international
subjects in a hard cover edition. The most popular charts
are on the Web site.
Federal Reserve Bulletin (www.bog.frb.fed.us/pubs/bulletin/default.htm) is a monthly publication of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. It compiles
articles that report on and analyze the financial services
sector and economic developments, discuss bank regula
tory issues, and present new data.
Survey of Current Business (w w w .bea.doc.gov/
bea/scbinf.htm l) is published m onthly by the U.S.
B ureau o f E conom ic Analysis, D e p a rtm e n t of
Commerce. This journal contains estimates and analyses
of all phases of the U.S. economy. The Internet version
must be subscribed to.
Economic Report of the President (www.stat-usa.gov/BEN/
publications.html) is a report issued by the U.S. Council
of Economic Advisers. It offers a comprehensive discus
sion of the U.S. economy, accompanied by more than
200 statistical tables.
PRINT RESOURCES

Industry Information
The WEFA Industrial Monitor is an annual publication of
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. It provides an analysis of more
than 130 industries, including an overview of supply and
demand conditions, industry trends, and historical and
projected growth rates. It discusses pricing trends and
industry structure and supports the analysis and discus
sion with graphs and tables. A com panion CD-ROM
allows downloading of text, graphs, and tables. Book:
$59.95; CD-ROM: $149.
RECENT COURT CASES

Discountfor Capital Gains
Eisenberg v. Commissioner, No. 17267-95, 1997 WL 663171
(U.S. Tax Court, October 27, 1997).

CM&gxvt
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SEVEN HUNDRED SIT FOR ABV EXAM

Almost 700 CPAs took the first w ritten
examination for the Accredited in Business
Valuation (ABV) designation in ten cities
across the U.S. on November 15, 1997. The
ABV credential was awarded to 520 of the
candidates.
To earn the ABV credential, in addition
to passing the written exam, candidates
must provide evidence of ten business valua
tion engagem ents that dem onstrate sub
stantial experience and com petence. To
maintain the credential, every three years,
they must submit evidence of substantial
involvement and continued competency in
five business valuation engagements, and
they must earn sixty hours of related CPE.
The next exam is scheduled for Monday,
November 2, 1998. The cities in which it will
be administered will be determ ined later
this year.
T he AICPA has m ain tain ed a list of
members who requested information pack
ets for the first exam, but chose not to par
ticipate. Those members will automatically
receive updated information about the next
examination, along with a new application
and experience affidavit in April.
Other members can request information
packets by—
▲ Calling the ABV HelpLine at 212-5966254.
▲ Faxing th e ir re q u e st to the ABV
FaxLine at 212-596-6268: Include firm
name, telephone and fax numbers, e-mail
address, and AICPA member number.
▲ Visit the AICPA H om epage at
www.aicpa.org/members/div/mcs/abv.htm.
GLOSSARY OF BUSINESS VALUATION TERMS
IN PROGRESS

To foster uniformity in the provision of
business valuation services, the organiza
tions that represent business valuation pro
fessionals have form ed a task force to
develop a glossary of as many terms used in
business valuation practice as possible.
James L. “Butch” Williams, a member of the
AICPA Business Valuations and Appraisals
Subcommittee, organized the task force. In
addition to the AICPA, the participating
societies are th e A m erican Society of
Appraisers (ASA), Institute of Business
Appraisers (IBA), the Canadian Institute of
Chartered Business Valuators (CICBV), and

the N atio n al A ssociation of C ertified
Valuation Analysts (NACVA). Each society
will have two representatives on the task
force.
ABA BEGINS MODEL MEDIATION LAW
PROJECT

The American Bar Association Section of
Dispute Resolution is developing a model
law to regulate mediation. The ABA expects
the project, which began last Fall, to take
th re e years. Its aim is to rep lace the
“nation’s current patchwork of intricate,
confusing, and often conflicting state laws
on m ediation with a simplified uniform
standard.” The project will conclude with a
presen tatio n to the Section of Dispute
Resolution’s Section Council in 2000 and
subsequently to the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Members of the AICPA Litigation and
Dispute Resolution Services Subcommittee
have discussed the project with the ABA and
have been assured that there is no intention
of excluding CPAs from mediation.
The first phase of the project includes a
review of existing state and federal media
tion statutes and court rules. Their findings
will focus on specific issues including media
tor qualification, confidentiality, and the
effect of coercion. The drafting phase will
be completed in 1999 and will be followed
by an opportunity for comments before the
proposed model law is made final.
The project welcomes ideas and sugges
tions, which can be directed to Richard C.
Reuben, Associate Director of the Stanford
C enter on C onflict and N egotiation at
richard@leland.stanford.edu.
Submitted by Nicholas Dewar, CPA
Kinsel Streiff & Newton, LLP
433 California Street, Suite 520
San Francisco, CA 94104
INVESTIGATING WHITE COLLAR CRIME

R onald L. D urkin, CPA, o f N eilson,
Elggren, Durkin & Company, Los Angeles,
CA reviewed Investigating White Collar Crime:
Embezzlement and Financial Fraud by
L ie u te n a n t
H ow ard
E. W illiams
(S p rin g field , Ill.: C harles C. T hom as
Publishing, 1997) in the January/February
issue of CPA Management Consultant. Durkin
found that the book provides some helpful
guidance to CPAs involved in fraud investi
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gation. He “particularly liked Williams’s cat
egorization and descriptions of white-collar
crime: crimes com m itted by individuals
against institutions, crimes in furtherance of
a legitimate business, and criminal activity
disguised as a leg itim ate business. In
describing these crimes, Williams provides
the reader with some very valuable insights
into the criminal mind.
“Any fraud investigator will benefit from
reading Williams’s description of the ele
ments of a fraud case and his lengthy discus
sion of the reliance by victims on false rep
resentations.
“For fraud investigators, probably the
most helpful aspect of the book is the chap
ter dealing with financial interviewing and
interrogation. Although it would be rare for
a CPA to interrogate the subject of a fraud
investigation, the sections dealing with how
to conduct an interview will enlighten even
an experienced investigator....
“Investigating White Collar Crime appears to
be written primarily for the law enforce

AICPA
Harborside Financial Center
201 Plaza Three
Jersey City, NJ 07311-3881
ADDRESS SERVICE REQUESTED

ment community...not...for CPAs, since he
spends two c h a p te rs discussing basic
ac co u n tin g term in o lo g y and theory.
However, the section dealing with financial
statem ent ratios and analysis is a good
refresher for CPAs.”
Durkin faults the author for failing to
caution read ers th a t the in v estig ato r’s
report should present factual information
without offering an opinion about whether
a fraud has been perpetrated. That is a con
clusion to be left to the client or the trier of
fact. Durkin cites a few other of the book’s
sho rtco m in g s, b u t he co n clu d es th a t
“accountants will find Investigating White
Collar Crime to be a useful reference guide
on how to conduct a fraud investigation.”
MCS S ection m em bers receive CPA
Management Consultant as a member benefit.
Readers who do not receive the newsletter
and wish to receive a sample copy with
Durkin’s review should call Bill Moran at
201-938-3502; fax: 201-938-3780; e-mail:
wmoran@aicpa.org. CE
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